## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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
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## Approved For Release 2007/11/06 : CIA-RDP84M00390R000300040039-8 UNCLASSIFIED

Intelligence Community "Wish List"

·	25 <b>X</b> 1
Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment: The current system for controlling the number and location of USG employees overseas as administered by the State Department is unduly restrictive and unresponsive to the changing circumstances	25X1
Determination of the number and location of intelligence agency	25X1 25X1
Office Space: The operations of several intelligence agenciesparticularly DIA, NSA, and CIAare hampered by crowded or highly dispersed office space. Current proposals to build new facilities for DIA and NSA should be fully funded	25 <b>X</b> 1
and CIA should take prompt action to provide adequate consolidated office space for its analytical and production components at its Headquarters.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Hiring Freeze: The hiring freeze is not only resulting in a general understaffing of most of the agencies of the Intelligence Community, but also causing an imbalance in the staffing pattern within and among these agencies. The freeze should be lifted or substantially modified for the Community so that we can fully staff programs that have been given added emphasis in the current budget and can hire people with sorely needed skills and experience. The Community should get early relief also because its time-consuming clearance process makes its "catchup time" longer than for other sectors of the Executive Branch.	25X1
Identities Legislation: The publication of the identities of intelligence personnel has often embarrassed those who are subject to service overseas or clandestine assignment and has made them and the USG targets for harassment and even physical violence. Legislation prohibiting such public identification, from classified or unclassified sources, should be enacted. The USG owes its intelligence employees and their families at least this degree of legal protection not so much to deceive such a highly professional intelligence service as the KGB, but to deny their identification as targets for violence by terrorists and irresponsible fringe elements.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Information Mentioning U.S. Persons: The Privacy Act, E.O. 12036, guidance from the Attorney General and implementing regulations of the various intelligence agencies regarding handling of information mentioning U.S. persons have severely restricted counterintelligence and other legitimate activities. The wording of these documents is very confusing about what activities are actually authorized. Often intelligence officers are reluctant to report or record potentially useful counterintelligence and other information. These documents should be reviewed in order to first eliminate all restrictions not essential to protecting the constitutional rights of U.S. persons and second, to produce an easily understood set of directives for handling intelligence information mentioning U.S. persons	25 <b>Y</b> 1

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Reserve for Contingencies: From time-to-time modest funding is required to meet needs or to exploit opportunities which were not foreseen during the budget process. Although some of these can be funded by reprogramming, others are so urgent or unusual that reprogramming is inappropriate. Important contingencies of this kind occur frequently enough as to call for establishing a special reserve for this purpose.

This new reserve would be allocated to the DCI for use with any agency in the Intelligence Community.

funds would be authorized and appropriated and guidelines would be established

regarding its use and reporting to Congress.

Expertise: Advancement in the Intelligence Community above certain levels, valued opportunities for training and travel and general recognition appear to go to "generalists" or those in management positions. Statements by senior officials and policy directives tend to extol the virtues of broadening experiences and encourage rotational assignments while depreciating, if only by implication, the importance of developing expertise. Although broadening experiences are essential for developing senior officials and useful for others, not all employees are slated for the most senior positions. In order to improve the quality of intelligence, particularly on the Third World, new efforts are needed to acquire, develop and retain experts on a wide variety of subjects, languages and countries. Monetary incentives, promotions, training opportunities, and travel should be increased and the working environment improved to foster these objectives. Finally, the tone of descriptions of career development opportunities should be revised immediately to emphasize the importance and rewards for those most suited to specialization.

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